Detention of applicants for international protection in CPRs: the Court of Cassation underscores the role of judicial review by the detention judge as a guarantee of the effective protection of personal liberty.
Cass., Sez. I pen., sent. 27 febbraio 2026 (dep. 3 marzo 2026), n. 8261, Pres. De Marzo, rel. Natalini
A recent ruling of the Court of Cassation addresses the detention of applicants for international protection in CPRs (pre-removal detention centres).
The case concerns the detention of an Egyptian national who had lived in Italy for more than twenty years and served as an imam of a mosque in Turin. In November 2025, he was the subject of a ministerial expulsion order on grounds of national security, following certain statements made during a public demonstration and in light of his alleged role in fostering a process of religious radicalisation marked by an antisemitic outlook. At the same time, his EU long-term residence permit was revoked. During the validation proceedings of the order for escort to the border, he lodged an application for international protection; consequently, a subsequent detention order was issued placing him in a CPR.
The detention was initially validated by the Court of Appeal, which, however, upon review, ordered its termination, finding that there were no concrete elements to substantiate the individual’s alleged dangerousness.
In dismissing the appeal and thus upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Court of Cassation undertakes an in-depth examination of the scope of judicial review entrusted to the judge overseeing detention as guarantor of the individual’s personal liberty.
Specifically, when ruling on the lawfulness of detention, the judicial authority is required to conduct a thorough assessment of whether the conditions justifying the adoption of such a restrictive measure of personal liberty are met. Indeed, detention may be validated and maintained only where a continuing condition of social dangerousness is established. The Court of Cassation therefore emphasises the importance of a careful balancing of the interests at stake, devoting particular attention to the principle of proportionality as a fundamental interpretative standard in assessing the suitability of the measure. Deprivation of personal liberty may be resorted to only where all less restrictive measures prove inadequate to meet the needs of the specific case. Such an assessment must necessarily be entrusted to the judicial authority, within the framework of a required substantive review of any act that constitutes an interference by the State with the exercise of fundamental rights, foremost among them personal liberty as an inviolable right of every individual.


